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 The Irish Citizen Army after 1916
 Brian Hanley
 That the Irish Citizen Army (ICA) remained in existence for almost two decades after the 1916 Rising
 has been noted in several studies. However, little attention has been paid to its politics. It has been
 described as essentially 'passive' during the war of independence, but 'one hundred per cent
 republican' in its reaction to the Anglo-Irish Treaty.1 Its re-emergence in 1934 has been treated solely
 as a result of the formation of the Republican Congress.2 While the minor role of the ICA in the 1919
 23 period cannot be gainsaid, there were a variety of reasons for this. The organisation was never clear
 on its political and military purposes and was hidebound both by a petty application of formal
 discipline and by the tendency of its members to use it as a social club. Its attitude to the national
 struggle and the Treaty was the subject of internal controversy and led to a split in 1922. A key factor
 in this split was the attitude within the ICA to the ITGWU leadership. The individuals who relaunched
 the ICA during the 1930s did so on their own initiative and the organisation was politically more
 vibrant in that period than it had been before 1922. After 1934 the politics of this grouping underwent
 major changes eventually leading to its immersion in mainstream labour politics. Indeed, the ICA
 provided the core of the group that pushed the Labour Party towards endorsing the 'workers' republic'
 as its objective in 1936.
 The war of independence
 Throughout the war of independence there were probably never more than 250 people involved in the
 ICA. The organisation was centred on Dublin, where at least 120 members assembled for a battalion
 convention in June 1919. A number of the ICA's Dublin units were organised in areas outside the city,
 such as Terenure, Baldoyle, and Lucan.3 At various stages the ICA also had members in Cork,
 Monaghan (where Peadar O'Donnell organised a unit in June 1919), Derry, Drogheda and Glasgow.4
 Its leadership was composed of veterans of the 1913-16 period such as Frank Robbins, Michael
 Donnelly, Séamus McGowan, Dick McCormack, John Hanratty, Robert De Coeur and John Byrne.
 James O'Neill served as commandant, in effect chief of staff, from 1917 to 1921.' The ICA also
 continued to include women and Countess Markievicz, despite her status as minister of labour in the
 first Dáil, served as a member of the army council and regularly attended (and chaired) its meetings
 during 1919-20. Madeleine ffrench Mullen became a member of the army council in early 1920, while
 Dr Kathleen Lynn was offered a position on the army council but declined it. Socialist Party of Ireland
 (SPI) member Margaret Skinnider assisted in drilling female ICA members during 1920.'' While all
 these women were 1916 veterans, the women and girls among the ICA rank and file included some
 who joined the organisation as new recruits during 1919. There was also a small youth section.7
 To what extent did the ICA operate militarily during the war of independence? Members were
 drilled on a weekly basis in rooms given over to the ICA at Liberty Hall. There was irregular training
 in the use of small arms and various efforts made to organise instruction classes and camps. The army
 council's bi-weekly meetings took place under armed guard from February 1919 onwards. The
 organisation issued instructions to its members on when and when not to offer armed resistance to
 police and British army raids in March 1919.8 Members in the printing trade helped publish and
 distribute IRA propaganda. The organisation also carried out 'detective work' on behalf of the IRA.
 Likewise, Citizen Army women carried out medical support work for the republican forces. Members
 stole and bought weapons from British soldiers and carried and hid arms for the IRA.9 Séamus
 McGowan as director of munitions claimed to have secured about forty rifles through contacts with
 the British army in 1918.'° On one occasion ICA members stewarding a proscribed Connolly
 commemoration fired on police, wounding four of them." Aside from that incident there is little
 evidence of ICA armed activity on its own initiative and the organisation usually functioned in a
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 support capacity for the IRA. This undoubtedly produced some frustration and members left to join
 the larger and more active organisation on several occasions. Some attempted to retain dual
 membership, until this was proscribed by the ICA in July 1919.12 Even more likely to frustrate ICA
 members in the increasingly bitter struggle between the IRA and the crown forces were orders to
 avoid making 'enemies of the garrison'. Instead, members were ordered to appeal to rank and file
 soldiers on a class basis and 'bring them round to the people's side'.13 Whatever usefulness this policy
 may once have had (and the ICA did recruit at least some ex-soldiers to its ranks) it was unlikely to
 win many converts during the war of independence.14 On several occasions during early 1919 ICA
 members were reprimanded for starting fights with soldiers at public meetings and rallies. Frustration
 at lack of activity was also expressed through the unauthorised holding up of British soldiers, and
 demands for armed assistance to locals in Dorset Street who were being terrorised by a 'gang of
 rowdies'. Members also had to be disciplined for unauthorised raiding for arms.15 On another occasion
 an ICA man drew his gun during scuffles at an ITGWU-sponsored debate between supporters of P.T.
 Daly and William O'Brien at the Mansion House. While he claimed to have acted in 'self defence'
 this type of incident did little to improve the tense relationship between the ICA and Liberty Hall.16 It
 also reflected the continuing belief of many ICA members that they owed their allegiance to James
 Larkin and not the ITGWU leadership. Robert De Couer claimed to have been treated disrespectfully
 by O'Brien and Thomas Foran during a meeting to secure the hall for a concert.17 In April 1919 the
 ITGWU was demanding that the ICA cease using its rooms for military training, which the ICA
 attempted to circumvent by ordering its members to drill 'quietly'. However by 1920 the organisation
 was forced by military raids to discontinue using Liberty Hall, and made use of the Trades Hall in
 Capel Street.18
 Political and social views
 Several accounts assign blame for this inactivity to the leadership of James O'Neill. Yet factors other
 than his alleged passivity were important. The organisation had no clearly defined ideology,
 containing members sympathetic to republicanism, Larkinism. mainstream labour, and communism.
 Crucially, the relationship between the ICA and the republican movement was never adequately
 explained. The closest the ICA came to outlining the difference between itself and the IRA was a
 statement in 1920 that it existed primarily to give armed backing to organised labour. In theory only
 trade unionists were allowed into membership. However, the organisation realised that labour might
 wish to disassociate itself from actions the ICA might take on its behalf.20 Yet a reading of the army
 council's minutes for 1919-20 mention no incidence of armed backing being given to labour, aside
 from the stewarding of the Connolly commemoration in June 1919. On that occasion, having been
 invited by the SPI to steward the event, the ICA had decided that if the commemoration were banned,
 they would hold their own meeting, using force if necessary.21 However, the organisation refused a
 request to allow the ICA pipe band to march in support of SPI candidate Walter Carpenter in
 December 1919, preferring to support republican candidates.22 A discussion of what might occur if the
 Limerick general strike of April 1919 spread produced no conclusion or suggestion of aid.21 Appeals
 for the ICA to join in efforts to have Jim Larkin released were rejected on the basis that Delia Larkin
 had used the ICA's name without permission and that the ICA as a 'physical movement' had its own
 plans to free Larkin if 'passive' activity failed. Markievicz also assured the membership that the
 republican movement in the US was already doing 'their best' for Larkin.24 Her position as a Dáil
 minister, while also an ICA member, seems to have gone unquestioned. She acted instead as a conduit
 between the ICA and the IRA, passing on notice of Sinn Féin rallies and gaining permission for ICA
 members to intervene in the case of the Dorset St 'rowdies'.25 However, some frustration was
 expressed at her perceived unwillingness to organise the ICA outside Dublin and in one case she had
 to be 'ordered' to start a unit.26
 Eventually the lack of policy caused dissension. In January 1920 Michael Donnelly argued that the
 ICA had ceased to fight for a workers' republic and had become a 'tail' of Sinn Féin. He criticised the
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 fact that there were some ICA members in Sinn Féin clubs and that the organisation seemed to have
 no independent policy. He argued that it was 'illogical' to back the IRA, as they were not fighting for
 the same type of republic as the ICA. Dick McCormack accused him of wanting to 'break up' the
 ICA.27 McCormack was in turn charged by Donnelly of using armed force to intimidate a lorry man
 outside Liberty Hall. Frank Robbins also accused McCormack of being among those who threatened
 a shop steward at gunpoint in Capel Street. Both these incidents occurred during strikes, the
 circumstances of which are unclear. While the army council agreed that McCormack was at fault in
 the first case at least, his long record of service was taken into account and he was not punished.25 It
 is clear, however, that some personal enmity existed between McCormack and both Robbins and
 Donnelly, as well as political differences.
 In the absence of any clearly defined role, the ICA developed an obsession with the protection of
 its separate status and its reputation. It refused to sell Sean O'Casey's Story of the Irish Citizen Army
 on the basis that it was 'inaccurate in many points'.2" In late 1920 McGowan was disciplined for
 allowing his ICA title to be used at a Larkin support meeting. He countered by asking why Markievicz
 had never been disciplined for speaking at numerous Sinn Féin rallies.30 When a former member, Seán
 McLaughlin, presented a report to the Third International on working-class organisations in Ireland
 which contained criticisms of the ICA, the organisation issued a 'warrant' for his arrest. After several
 weeks McLaughlin was tracked down but refused to appear before the army council in Liberty Hall.
 He was eventually questioned but escaped punishment and applied to rejoin the ICA some time later.31
 It is clear that the social aspects of the ICA were a major attraction to its membership. Twice
 weekly, members gathered to play cards in the ICA rooms, with north and south Dublin members
 meeting on alternate nights. There was also an ICA football team and the ICA Pipe Band to compete
 for members' time.32 The organisation admitted during 1920 that the card rooms and band practice
 were 'mitigating against drilling'.'3 There were also long running leadership discussions about the
 supply of tunics and the addition of a red plume to the army's slouch hat. A great deal of time was
 also expended on organising social events and raffles.34 Yet these social activities too pointed to
 contradictions in the ICA's egalitarianism. The card rooms were used by men only, while ICA women
 and girls gathered in the passages outside. The ICA's Irish language classes were also segregated.3''
 Lily Shanahan found herself charged with impertinence when she told an officer that the 'girls were
 not wanted only when there was dirty work to be done'. On being questioned she argued that it was
 always women who had to sell flags and raffle tickets, as well as distribute pamphlets. The ICA
 leadership also complained of the 'girls' 'carrying on disorderly' in the halls.36 Male members were
 warned on using 'bad language' while 'girls were listening' and the Connolly birthday dance was
 forbidden to feature any of that 'stuff termed Jazz'. More seriously, ICA officer Joe Doyle had to
 discipline his men for 'interfering' with some Jews after a rally in February 1919 and order them not
 to do so in future.37
 Despite the prestige and status gained by its involvement in the 1916 Rising the ICA played no real
 role in working-class struggles during the 1919-21 period and only an auxiliary one in the war of
 independence. What options were open to it militarily given the numerical dominance of the IRA is
 of course debatable. But given the explosion of working-class militancy throughout the period, its
 inactivity in that field was its major weakness. The differences among the ICA leadership largely
 account for this, as well as the absence of a clear political purpose.
 The Treaty
 The attitude of the ICA towards the Treaty also needs reappraisal. The organisation did not
 unanimously reject the Treaty. A majority, initially at least, seem to have adopted the same attitude as
 the leadership of the ITGWU, that of a cautious neutrality. From late 1921 there was increasing
 frustration at the tactics of both factions of the IRA expressed in the Watchword of Labour, There
 were reports of republican police arresting strikers, and IRA units backing farmers in disputes with
 labourers, and unease that both factions seemed to be a 'law unto themselves'.38 One ICA officer
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 complained of the 'wild' behaviour of the 'Free State and Republican mobs' in Terenure, who had
 molested civilians on numerous occasions. He wished that the ICA could provide some protection
 against them and claimed his men would not hesitate to shoot 'both parties'.39 It is possibly this type
 of frustration, rather than simply the machinations of William O'Brien and Cathal O'Shannon, which
 saw the ICA willing to become part of a nationwide 'Irish Workers Army' in the spring of 1922,
 neutral of both pro and anti-Treatyite forces. O'Shannon had signalled that such an independent force
 was desirable as early as July 1920.40 Meetings took place between the ICA and senior ITGWU
 figures, which agreed on a nationwide recruitment drive to establish the new army. O'Brien reported
 'very encouraging' responses from ITGWU branches to the suggestion of the new force in March
 1922.'' Two months later Michael Donnelly and John Byrne claimed that there was 'growing demand'
 among trade union members for the force. After the formation of a number of units outside Dublin, a
 convention had been held, which appointed an executive committee to oversee the development of the
 Workers' Army.42 The aims of the new army were to defend Ireland against 'foreign aggression',
 protect workers during strikes, secure the rights of workers as 'citizens', and fight for the ultimate aim
 of a workers' republic. The ICA would provide its core. The desire to resist 'foreign aggression'
 reflected genuine nationalist feeling within the ICA ranks. The Terenure officer who had complained
 about the rival republican 'mobs' also argued that ammunition be stocked up by the ICA, so as to
 'shoot the English later'.43 But there were dissenting voices. In June a number of ICA officers,
 including McCormack, de Couer and John Hanratty, attacked the Workers' Army idea as a plot by the
 ITGWU leadership to claim its 'place in the sun of the British Empire'. Claiming to owe allegiance
 to Larkin as ICA 'commander-in-chief', the officers berated the 'Judases' who had stood aloof from
 the ICA during the recent conflict but now sought to use them. They particularly singled out the fact
 that the ICA had provided stewards for Labour's rally during the general strike against militarism in
 April, which they claimed was organised to give 'sanction to the Free State'.44 Séamus McGowan, too,
 had been expelled from the ICA in late 1921 and orders issued to forcibly remove him if he turned up
 for parades.45 This was linked to efforts to prevent members of the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI),
 which McGowan was to join, from infiltrating the ICA. British communists had urged the CPI to
 engage with the ICA in order to purge it of its 'bourgeois' tendencies.46 Though CPI leader Roddy
 Connolly had served in the ICA as aide de camp to his father in Easter Week, he was unable to
 persuade the army to associate in any way with the communists. The CPI subsequently formed its own
 'red guard'.47
 The civil war
 While the communists attributed their exclusion to the influence of the 'sleek headed intellectual'
 O'Shannon, it was the case that senior and long serving ICA men such as Robbins, Donnelly, O'Kelly,
 and Byrne were backing the ITGWU leadership's line.48 Their section of the ICA provided the armed
 stewards for the anti-militarist rally. While the irony of armed men belonging to a self-proclaimed
 army protesting against militarism has been noted, their position was not inexplicable. The Robbins
 Donnelly faction argued that they were obviously not opposed to armed force per se, but to
 'brigandage and the idea of an army not being responsible to civil authority'. They refuted the claim
 that they stood 'for Empire', arguing that the section of the ICA opposing the Workers' Army was
 dragooning the workers into association with the 'murderers of Connolly' by weakening the Labour
 Party effort at the general election. They claimed that the ITGWU leadership had supported the ICA
 'in every manner possible', while critics had refused actively to organise it among the workers.4' That
 the anti-Treatyites were somehow the natural allies of labour was not clear at all in early 1922. The
 Workers' Army faction claimed that while some of their critics were in contact with the anti-Treatyite
 forces in the Four Courts, the 'irregular' IRA had locked up the leading ICA officer in Roscrea.5" Other
 factors such as the fear that Labour candidates would not be able to campaign without armed guard
 and that the provisional government might become a military dictatorship probably also weighed on
 their minds. Hence, organised labour would need an armed force to protect it from the 'Green and
This content downloaded from 129.215.236.142 on Wed, 08 Nov 2017 13:06:47 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE IRISH CITIZEN ARMY AFTER 1916  41
 Tannery' of both sides. ! Nor was it the case that the Labour Party was irrelevant in an election
 dominated by the Treaty: it secured more votes than the anti-Treatyites in Dublin and had seventeen
 TDs elected. There was a sizable working-class constituency unimpressed by either republican
 faction.52 While O'Brien and O'Shannon may have had no intention of ever utilising the Workers'
 Army as an effective force, it is unfair to assume that its ICA supporters did not act honestly. After
 all Donnelly had been critical for some time of the ICA's failure to differentiate itself from the
 republican movement.
 Nevertheless, a significant section of the ICA took the anti-Treaty side in the civil war, including
 some of those (such as the Terenure unit) who had been uneasy about supporting the republicans
 earlier in the year. Despite the ICA's initial contact with the Four Courts garrison it was not until the
 autumn of 1922 that the anti-Treaty IRA officially gave orders to its officers to 'co-operate in a
 definite way' with them. The IRA's Dublin adjutant met Dick McCormack and asked him to supply
 lists of men working in on the railways, on ships and in the printing trade. The IRA estimated the
 ICA's membership at about 200 in the Dublin area, with access to approximately 100 handguns. The
 ICA women were to operate with Cumann na mBan. The IRA also hoped to make use of Roddy
 Connolly's 'Red army'.53 That the IRA had no intention of making the ICA equal partners is evident
 from the tone of its communications. The IRA felt it essential that workers be prevented, physically
 if necessary, from aiding the Free State and facilitating the movement of National Army troops. Thus
 the IRA 'could use' the working-class connections of the ICA and Connolly's 'bunch' for intelligence
 and sabotage.54 The extent of ICA action in the civil war is difficult to quantify. By August ten of its
 members were in jail. During the summer it took part in blocking roads and mounting armed patrols
 in Rathfarnham and Tallaght, and clashed with Free State troops at Glenasmole. It also assisted the
 IRA in the provision of safe houses, collecting arms and equipment, and planning a breakout from
 Mountjoy prison in early 1923.55 Given that the ICA was largely a Dublin-based organisation and that
 anti-Treaty activity in the city was very limited after August 1922, it is not surprising that it was able
 to do little.
 Reorganisation
 The years after the civil war saw sporadic attempts to organise left-wing armed groups. McGowan
 became active in the James Connolly Workers' Club during the late 1920s. At a meeting of the club
 in 1929 Roddy Connolly suggested the formation of a Workers' Defence Corps or a 'new ICA'.56
 When the Irish Labour Defence League was founded in July that year a number of members again
 discussed a likely armed component, with Helena Molony urging the reformation of the ICA.57
 However, the involvement of large numbers of IRA members in the league meant that they would
 dominate any new body. Connolly had expressed the view that the IRA should not be allowed have
 the 'monopoly' on armed force, but the difficulty was of course that by 1930 the IRA was increasingly
 taking action itself in labour disputes, and had the numbers and arms to make the efforts of others
 seem pointless.5" It was not until increasing political divisions split the IRA, and within a very changed
 political atmosphere, that the ICA re-emerged.
 The fact that 1933 had seen the most serious violence directed against the left since the civil war
 possibly influenced the decision to relaunch the ICA. In April mobs had sacked the CPI's Connolly
 House and attacked the Workers' College. Left-wing meetings were menaced increasingly by anti
 communist gangs and by the autumn the blueshirts had become a major force. McGowan,
 McCormack, and Frank Purcell were at the heart of the ICA's re-organisation in early 1934. Their
 small grouping had continued to maintain a skeleton organisation in the hope that one day the most
 'militant members' of the working class would realise the need for such a body.59 During 1934 the
 organisation once more emerged publicly, marching in the Wolfe Tone commemoration at
 Bodenstown and entering into negotiations with those left-wingers who had abandoned the IRA. The
 IRA, which saw it as linked to the split in its ranks, viewed the re-emergence of the ICA with
 suspicion. When the ICA applied to take part in the Bodenstown commemoration, Donal O'Donoghue
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 replied that there was no indication that the ICA
 had been in 'active existence' until the formation
 of an organisation 'hostile to the IRA'.60
 However, the ICA's revival was not a product
 of Republican Congress manipulation, although
 undoubtedly the appearance of a potentially
 vibrant left-republican organisation influenced the
 ICA's thinking. The members themselves claimed
 that they saw in the formation of the Congress the
 possibility that the 'best and most progressive
 elements' in the republican and labour movements
 could be mobilised. It was certainly not the case
 that the Congress 'dug up' a few ICA veterans to
 give 'colour' to their enterprise.61 For the
 Congress the ICA provided an opportunity to
 reassure members who were taunted by their
 former comrades in the IRA that they had
 'deserted the physical force movement'. Indeed, it
 seems many Congress activists 'demanded' some
 form of military organisation.62
 Roddy Connolly helped Mick Price and
 George Gilmore meet the eight members of the
 ICA army council. According to Price, the ICA
 decided to re-organise and recruit openly,
 regardless of what the 'armed groups' affiliated to
 the Republican Congress intended doing. The ICA
 had members scattered across four trade unions in
 Michael Price
 Dublin, but they planned to extend their membership as widely as possible, while also seeking official
 trade union support. They saw themselves at this point as 'primarily...an Anti-Fascist Force'. In their
 appeal for support from trade unions they intended to use Labour leader William Norton's statement
 that the 'Fascists will only come to power in Ireland over the dead bodies of workers'. Nevertheless,
 the ICA made it clear that their 'limited forces' would remain independent of all political parties,
 including the Congress, although that could change if the Congress created a 'real revolutionary
 party'. However, they agreed to co-opt four representatives of the Congress onto their army council.63
 The Congress would later claim that there were only twenty ICA members in Dublin before it
 facilitated the addition of 'hundreds' of ex-IRA members.64 Whatever about the numbers involved
 there was little scope for ICA armed activity prior to the September 1934 Rathmines meeting, to
 which all units were ordered to send two delegates. Among those who attended were McGowan,
 Purcell, Joe Doyle, Liam Kelly and Seamus O'Brien.65
 Political re-evaluation
 At Rathmines the ICA veterans backed the Price/Connolly proposal to form an openly socialist
 political party. Although the proposal was defeated there was not an immediate rupture and relations
 with the Republican Congress remained confused for a period. Roddy Connolly, for example,
 continued as a Congress member well into 1935, despite the defeat of his proposal. Price and Nora
 Connolly O'Brien on the other hand left the Congress and were soon involved with the ICA. By
 November the ICA was announcing that the 'merger' between itself and the Congress was at an end.
 There followed a bout of mutual recrimination and vitriol, during which both sides claimed to
 represent the majority of ICA members. For a period Roddy Connolly continued as chief of staff of
 one faction and urged his supporters to ignore the 'hysterical' ICA Bulletin, which he suggested was
 fit only for exhibition in a revolutionary museum in a future workers' republic.66 He in turn was
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 accused of betraying the 'old Bolsheviks' he had praised at Rathmines and colluding with the ex-IRA
 element's 'despicable efforts' to destroy the 1CA. Congress supporters also mocked the ICA veterans
 by accusing them of having chosen the 'dodgers-dug out' while they had been active in the IRA
 during the 1920s.67 Eventually both factions would be content to ignore each other but Price continued
 to maintain that the Congress 'had a lot to answer for' in its failure to capitalise on the opportunities
 of 1934. The Price-led ICA claimed about 300 members in early 1935, which would suggest that a
 substantial number of IRA veterans remained with this faction. The organisation's largest unit was in
 Dublin where the Connolly Mallin Hall in Parnell Square was used for meetings, drilling and social
 events. There were also units in Belfast, Cork, Limerick and Kilkenny.68
 Politically the ICA maintained that a triple alliance was necessary tor the attainment of a
 workers' republic: an industrial union, a socialist party, and a workers' army.69 It never renounced
 arms, believing that in the last instance the overthrow of capitalism would require force. However,
 the IRA was criticised for elitism and putschism. " For the ICA violence would only come at the final
 stage of a popular revolution after the 'widest support' had been won through 'social and political
 activity'.71 The ICA Bulletin reminded its readers that 'skill with a rifle was not more important than
 your patience on a picket line, nor are either of these more salient than your electoral activity'.'2 The
 Dublin tramway strike of March 1935 did produce a threat that the guns of the ICA would not
 'remain silent' if troops were used against strikers, but this rhetoric was increasingly rare in ICA
 propaganda.™
 Allied to this was a marked downplaying of nationalist rhetoric. The ICA claimed that while 'break
 the connection with England' had been a good slogan, 'break the connection with capitalism' was a
 better one because it included that 'lesser evil' with the greater.14 In 1935 the ICA refused to support
 either the IRA Easter or Bodenstown commemorations, arguing that it had 'subordinated itself' for
 too long to the idea of 'all together against the British' and had neglected the struggle against
 economic injustice. Republican slogans such as 'England is our only enemy' were now judged to be
 both misleading and inadequate, as were campaigns to boycott British produce while scab goods were
 left unhindered.75 A key part of ICA strategy was the encouragement of militant industrial unionism.
 The ICA supported the idea of 'One Big Union' and expressed hostility to the 'multiplicity' of small,
 breakaway unions.76 It felt that the Republican Congress had neglected the trade union struggle and
 failed to base itself sufficiently on the organised working class.7 During the tramway dispute the ICA
 called for a general strike in response to government intervention.x The ICA also stressed the need to
 link the struggles of the unemployed and rural labour with industrial workers.7" A great deal of the
 ICA's thinking on trade unionism was dominated by the view that the unions were facing an imminent
 fascist assault, not from the blueshirts but from Fianna Fáil's 'practical Fascism'. The systems of
 'arbitration and conciliation' were seen as the 'first phase of the Corporate State' and Lemass was
 denounced for emulating Hitler by introducing the 1935 Conditions of Employment Act.80
 The Labour Party
 The ICA said little on international affairs, except to condemn the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
 While units were urged to have 'harmonious' relations with the IRA if possible, membership of the
 CPI was 'irreconcilable' with that of the ICA.82 Ironically given the ICA's gradual disavowal of
 nationalism one of the reasons for this was because the CPI was not an 'Irish' organisation, but a party
 whose 'base of control' lay in London and Moscow, from where it was 'rigidly' directed. The fact that
 the CPI had strongly opposed Price and Connolly at Rathmines and claimed that the ICA was making
 'a mockery' of the memory of the 1916 Citizen Army also no doubt contributed to this hostility.83
 There is no indication of how many women were members of the ICA, but Nora Connolly O'Brien
 did serve on the army council.84 Members were not forbidden from joining the National Army reserve
 forces or from claiming military service pensions. If brought before the courts they were urged to
 recognise them so as not to be 'easy prey' for the authorities.85 In a short period of time the
 organisation moved quite a distance from traditional republican practice.
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 With the failure of the Republican Congress to provide the basis of a socialist political organisation
 the ICA was forced to look elsewhere. During the tramway dispute it had called on Labour Party TDs
 to 'wake up' and use the Dáil to highlight the workers' fight.86 In June 1935 the ICA convention voted
 to instruct its membership to join both the Irish and Northern Ireland Labour Parties. One factor
 behind this decision was the belief that workers faced an 'imminent' threat of fascism 'in the guise of
 green'. Another was the belief that while workers were widely disillusioned with Fianna Fáil, the only
 organisations with the potential to 'detach' workers from Fianna Fáil and the IRA, and win cross
 community support in the north were the Labour parties. Within them, the ICA's 'young, enthusiastic
 and class conscious' revolutionaries could have a major impact.87 Members were ordered to join their
 local Labour branches and demand regular meetings and the distribution of publications and
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 WELL DOM TRAMWAYMEN I NO SURREHDER
 WHAT WE HAVE WE HOLD.
 * j, QnQffi. again the Bus and Taran strikers ha^e refused te» be the first
 body af Imsa workers to surrender the right to strike. By their decision
 they have proved that they understand the menace to Trades Unionismm in
 the Tramway Company's refusal to negotiate without resumption of workjand
 in spite of Lemasa' threat of legislation' against the right to strike they
 have declaimed that they will not relinquish the only sure method which the
 workers have to force consideration of their claims - the withdrawal of
 labour.
 All passible pressure has been, put upon the workers to compelithem
 to abandon their only surety that their demands will be considered; every
 attempt has been made by the Government and the Press to put the attitude
 of the strikers before the public in an unfair light. "No negotiations
 and no consideration of demands until the workers return to work" declared
 the autocratic Tramway Co. "(Juite right" re=lied Lemasa. "I'll do nothing
 to help end this strike unless, the strikers accept the Tramway Company's
 condition»"
 Lemasa1 attitude on behalf of the davemment is one of the most, open
 and blatant declarations ever made by a Government Minister that he sup
 ports the employer as against "persons employed". No attempt has been made
 by him to compel the Tramway Co. to negotiate. One whisper that the Gov
 ernment considered the Tramway Cq's., refusal to negotiate a breach of
 contract* and that by its umre a sonable attitude extending over such a long
 period it had voided its franchise; and that if "it w?t£ .determindd to
 maintain its unjustifiable position they were prepared to set in train
 $he municipalisation. of the Dublin Transport system,* would cause the Tram
 way Co. to consider quickly how they could most gracefully retract its
 decision not to negotiate. Negotiations would take place almost immed
 iately and the end of the strike would be in view,,
 But Lemass is not bég enough to "think of thus ending the strike. The
 Tramway Co. dictates to Lemasa» Lemass takes dictation from the Tramway
 Co., but, the strikers refuse to take dictation second-hand from Lamass.
 The workers' right to enforce consideration of their claims iffor
 better wages and conditions through the withdrawal of labour, and to
 remain on strike until their demands had been considered* has been won by
 the sacrifice of workers». It has been won through courage and endurance*
 courage to endure starvation,, misery, living death,, prison, even death
 itself. All these have been necessary to win the right to strike. Years
 of stubborn struggle and suffering were necessary to win recognition of
 that right and to maintain it. The Dublin Tramway workers are worthy
 inheritors of that struggle. They know that the winning of that right
 has cost the workers in the past* and have declared by their ballot that
 they will not be the first to throw away the fruits of that long uphill
 struggle.
 Thev h'p've rights who dare maintain thom. Tho .0+ -H Visir» «sVinww.
 ICA Bulletin, 26 April 1935.
 propaganda. Where the
 local party was resistant,
 as in Kilkenny, it was
 suggested that ICA
 members should write to
 Labour head office and
 inform them that a number
 of young workers were
 eager to get involved with
 the party but found the
 local branch apathetic.8'
 Once inside the party the
 ICA role was to argue that
 it would be impossible for
 Labour to become a major
 force unless it declared
 definitively as its 'ultimate
 aim and object - the
 Workers' Republic' and
 took an active role in the
 struggles of the urban and
 rural workers and the
 unemployed. Among the
 demands to be raised by
 ICA members were a five
 day, forty-hour working
 week, equal pay for
 women, a minimum wage,
 free school books, state
 housing and the division
 of 'ranches'. It was
 emphasised that this
 activity was to be geared
 towards building a
 revolutionary movement,
 not just, as the Kilkenny
 ICA were informed, for
 the 'mere purpose' of re
 electing local TD James
 Pattison."1 Activity in the
 Labour Party was the main
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 focus of the ICA from the summer of 1935. Activists were continually urged to push for the workers'
 republic slogan to be a major issue at the party's conference. Labour's attitude to the new recruits is
 hard to judge. Certainly some knew in advance that the ICA was intending to join their party and there
 seems to have been no effort to keep them out. The Kilkenny ICA did echo the perennial complaint
 of the left-wing labour activist that the local TD ignored them until 'posters need to be put up'." The
 ICA membership certainly played a role in the adoption by Labour of the workers' republic as its
 objective in February 1936. Both Price and Frank Purcell were delegates to the party conference and
 Price was elected to the administrative council.92 A year later he became secretary of the Dublin
 constituencies' council. Séamus McGowan would become a delegate to conference a year later. They
 were also joined by their adversary from the Republican Congress, Roddy Connolly, who himself was
 elected to the administrative council in 1937.93
 That Pnce oversaw this process was remarkable. From 1925 he had been one the IRA officers most
 associated with military rather than political action. He served as both director of intelligence and of
 training within the IRA, and was not identified with radical politics until 1934.94 In the space of a year
 he seems to have become rapidly disillusioned with militarism. Possibly because of the ex-ICA
 element's involvement, the Dublin Labour Party held protests against the British coronation in 1937
 and Labour News consistently campaigned for the rights of 'Old IRA' veterans, the paper adopting a
 marked nationalist tone.95 By that period the ICA's public appearances were confined to
 commemorations or campaigns through its Old Comrades' Association for pension rights for ex
 members.96
 Conclusion
 While the involvement oí McGowan and others assured continuity with the earlier organisation, the
 post-1934 ICA was more politically vibrant and active than its predecessor. It clearly attracted a
 number of young activists from the Republican Congress and went further than the Congress in its
 critique of republicanism. While it overestimated the extent of working-class disillusionment with
 Fianna Fáil, it was prepared to take a bold step in attempting to force the Labour Party leftwards.
 Indeed, it did achieve a measure of temporary success and its ultimate failure had more to do with the
 prevailing political climate in 1930s Ireland and the Labour Party itself, than the ICA."7 Its existence,
 and the appearance of similar if short lived groupings, over a twenty year period illustrates too the
 continuing attraction of militarism in the post revolutionary period for those on the left republican and
 labour fringe.98
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